Marxism and the Philosophy of Language
Vološinov, V. N. Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Trans. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986. Print.
SummaryIn part one, Volosinov says that ideologies are expressed in signs: “The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs […] wherever a sign is present, ideology is present, too” (10). He later examines how words express ideologies before those ideologies even come to fruition. In part two, he puts emphasis on how language is not individual, but rather social (12, 46), and attempts to connect individual thought with social language. Volosinov says meaning comes from human connection; we cannot talk about meaning without considering relationship. He argues that even the individual psyche has a social origin. Volosinov later suggests that psychology should be understood by understanding language, as language is a social phenomenon, and notes that our inner voice allows us to understand what others are saying (this voice is where we actually think). He goes on to examine how words have meanings only in the actual context in which they occur (36), and this is what is significant about them.
ResponseWhen Volosinov says, "Word is present in each and every act of understanding and in each and every act of interpretation" (14), I was reminded exactly why I love words and the power they hold in our lives. Further, this line would make a good writing/discussion prompt for my students, particularly during the first week of the semester in order to illustrate the power words and language hold in each sphere we inhabit.
Volosinov’s work actually reminded me a great deal of Bakhtin’s writing style, and Volosinov’s ideas about language remind me of Kenneth Burke’s notion of terminstic screens and fantasy types and themes. Terministic screens is where language deflects, selects, and reflects. Fantasy themes are units of information that essentially tell a story about a social group’s experience—they construct reality for the group. Fantasy types happen when groups recognize multiple fantasy themes that have been shared by the social group. For example, the “American Dream” would be considered a fantasy type, I believe. When we discussed whether or not a word is neutral, Julie’s metaphor of a word as a shell—an empty vessel—was helpful to me in imagining how we have so many different contexts in thinking about and defining words. Connections/Questions
I was surprised that Volosinov’s text didn’t seem to really have anything to do with Marxism, outside of claiming that language is in itself ideological.
In the 1920s, psychology was focused on behaviorism. Voloshinov seemed to be an advocate of social psychology. What kind of criticism did he receive from the psychology field during this period? How might we learn more about inner speech using objective scientific methods? Why can’t the “individual consciousness” (12) be used to help explain the creation of or use of signs within peoples’ interactions with one another? |
Key Quotes
“The very foundations of a Marxist theory of ideologies […] are closely bound up with problems of the philosophy of language” (9).
Ideology “is a fact of consciousness; the external body of the sign is merely a coating, merely a technical means for the realization of the inner effect, which is understanding” (11).
“Consciousness takes shape and being in the material of signs created by an organized group in the process of its social intercourse. He individual consciousness is nurtured on signs; it derives its growth from there; it reflects their logic and laws” (13).
Signs happen when people interact with one another in social settings (12).
“All of the properties of the word we have examined--its semiotic purity, its ideological neutrality, its involvement in behavioral communication, its ability to become an inner word, and finally, its obligatory presence, as an accompanying phenomenon, in any conscious act--all these properties make the word the fundamental object of the study of ideologies (15).
“Everything ideological possesses meaning: it repeats, depicts, or stands for something lying outside itself. In other words, it is a sign. Without signs, there is no ideology” (9).
“A sign does not simply exist as part of a reality—it reflects and refracts another reality” (10).
“Every sign is subject to the criteria of ideological evaluation” (10).
“The problem of the interrelationship of the basis and superstructures […] comes down to how actual existence (the basis) determines sign and how sign reflects and refracts existence in its process of generation […] Our concern with it has been limited to concretization of certain of its aspects and elucidation of the direction and routes to be followed in a productive treatment of it” (18-19, 24).
“[U]nderstanding is a response to a sign, with signs” (11).
“Signs emerge, after all, only in the process of interaction between one individual consciousness and another. And the individual consciousness itself is filled with signs” (11).
“The reality of the sign is wholly a matter determined by that communication. After all, the existence of the sign is nothing but the materialization of that communication” (13).
“The entire reality of the word is wholly absorbed in its function of being a sign” (14).
“A word is the purist and most sensitive medium of social intercourse” (14).
“Each period and each social group has had and has its own repertoire of speech forms for ideological communication in human behavior” (20).
“Every sign, as we know, is a construct between socially organized persons in the process of their interaction. Therefore, the forms of signs are conditioned above all by the social organization of the participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction. When these forms change, so does the sign” (21).
“Every ideological sign—the verbal sign included—in coming about through the process of social intercourse, is defined by the social purview of the given time period and the given social group” (21).
“[O]nly that which has acquired social value can enter the world of ideology, take shape, and establish itself there” (22).
“[E]ach living ideological sign has two faces, like Janus” (23).
"According to the teaching of abstract objectivism, language is handed down as a ready-made product from generation to generation" (81).
"Language is an ever-flowing stream of speech acts in which nothing remains fixed and identical to itself" (52).
"Any true understanding is dialogic in nature" (102).
"Every utterance is above all an evaluative orientation. Therefore, each element in a living utterance not only has a meaning but also has a value" (105).
"Word comes into contact with word. The context of this inner speech is the locale in which another's utterance is received, comprehended, and evaluated; it is where the speaker's active orientation takes place" (118).
Ideology “is a fact of consciousness; the external body of the sign is merely a coating, merely a technical means for the realization of the inner effect, which is understanding” (11).
“Consciousness takes shape and being in the material of signs created by an organized group in the process of its social intercourse. He individual consciousness is nurtured on signs; it derives its growth from there; it reflects their logic and laws” (13).
Signs happen when people interact with one another in social settings (12).
“All of the properties of the word we have examined--its semiotic purity, its ideological neutrality, its involvement in behavioral communication, its ability to become an inner word, and finally, its obligatory presence, as an accompanying phenomenon, in any conscious act--all these properties make the word the fundamental object of the study of ideologies (15).
“Everything ideological possesses meaning: it repeats, depicts, or stands for something lying outside itself. In other words, it is a sign. Without signs, there is no ideology” (9).
“A sign does not simply exist as part of a reality—it reflects and refracts another reality” (10).
“Every sign is subject to the criteria of ideological evaluation” (10).
“The problem of the interrelationship of the basis and superstructures […] comes down to how actual existence (the basis) determines sign and how sign reflects and refracts existence in its process of generation […] Our concern with it has been limited to concretization of certain of its aspects and elucidation of the direction and routes to be followed in a productive treatment of it” (18-19, 24).
“[U]nderstanding is a response to a sign, with signs” (11).
“Signs emerge, after all, only in the process of interaction between one individual consciousness and another. And the individual consciousness itself is filled with signs” (11).
“The reality of the sign is wholly a matter determined by that communication. After all, the existence of the sign is nothing but the materialization of that communication” (13).
“The entire reality of the word is wholly absorbed in its function of being a sign” (14).
“A word is the purist and most sensitive medium of social intercourse” (14).
“Each period and each social group has had and has its own repertoire of speech forms for ideological communication in human behavior” (20).
“Every sign, as we know, is a construct between socially organized persons in the process of their interaction. Therefore, the forms of signs are conditioned above all by the social organization of the participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction. When these forms change, so does the sign” (21).
“Every ideological sign—the verbal sign included—in coming about through the process of social intercourse, is defined by the social purview of the given time period and the given social group” (21).
“[O]nly that which has acquired social value can enter the world of ideology, take shape, and establish itself there” (22).
“[E]ach living ideological sign has two faces, like Janus” (23).
"According to the teaching of abstract objectivism, language is handed down as a ready-made product from generation to generation" (81).
"Language is an ever-flowing stream of speech acts in which nothing remains fixed and identical to itself" (52).
"Any true understanding is dialogic in nature" (102).
"Every utterance is above all an evaluative orientation. Therefore, each element in a living utterance not only has a meaning but also has a value" (105).
"Word comes into contact with word. The context of this inner speech is the locale in which another's utterance is received, comprehended, and evaluated; it is where the speaker's active orientation takes place" (118).