“The Principles of Phenomenology”
Peirce, Charles S. "The Principles of Phenomenology." Philosophical Writings of Peirce. Ed. Justus Buchler. New York: Dover, 1955. 73-97.
SummaryFirstness exists in and of itself; it holds possibility. However, we can't know firstness until we know secondness, which serves as facts. (Something can't exist until we make it fact--secondness). Thirdness serves as a mediator of sorts. Firstness and secondness are realized through thirdness, the connector, which allows us to know something for certain.
ResponsePeirce's concepts of firstness, secondness, and thirdness have been the most intriguing for me thus far in the course. The ambiguity of Peirce's concepts are inviting. I want to spend more time exploring these modes of being, as well as their (possible) connection to Heidegger's focus on embracing the ambiguity.
Connections/QuestionsPeirce's talk of consciousness connect to Vygotsky’s notions of inner and outer speech. The ambiguity of Peirce's concept of firstness, the possibility of something, also reminds me of Cassirer's talk of the need to embrace the open-ended questions with unknown answers.
Must we always begin with firstness (possibility)? Can secondness (fact) occur without us thinking of the possibility (forstness) of something's existence? Or must the possibility of something always occur before it becomes actual/fact (secondness)? |
Key Quotes
"It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first, feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of time, passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second, consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, synthetic consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought" (95).
"The elements of phenomena are of three categories, quality, fact, and thought" (86).
"For as long as things do not act upon one another there is no sense or meaning in saying that they have any being, unless it be that they are such in themselves that they may perhaps come into relation with others” (76).
“We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality” (76).
“[W]e live in two worlds, a world of fact and a world of fancy” (87).
"The elements of phenomena are of three categories, quality, fact, and thought" (86).
"For as long as things do not act upon one another there is no sense or meaning in saying that they have any being, unless it be that they are such in themselves that they may perhaps come into relation with others” (76).
“We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality” (76).
“[W]e live in two worlds, a world of fact and a world of fancy” (87).